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Chapter II
Nonrational Action
Introduction
A decision may be the result of our moral sensibilities
or the product of our passions or of the "piled up layers of
accumulated collective memory...the dammed up force of our
mysterious ancestors within us."1 A decision may also be the
instrument to implement historical forces which we experience
as external to ourselves which we must harness or of forces
built into our very natures as human beings or of forces which
we encounter in the environment in which the society
developed. This chapter will explore these six perspectives on
understanding a decision to go to war. I refer to them, for
reasons which I will give shortly, as nonrational decisions,
and the actions which follow as nonrational actions.
In a rational action, the decision and the reasons
offered for making that decision are contestable. "Beliefs, on
this view, have a rational foundation if they are defensible
or challengeable, if reasons in their support can be offered
or demanded. Thus understood, rationality serves as a
presupposition of contestability: giving reasons makes
contestation possible."2 There is a presumption that a
different balance of reasons could have persuaded the agent to
do something other than what was decided. There is the
presumption that after the decision is made and the action
unfolds, the agent could admit that s/he was mistaken.
This does not mean that rational actions are not affected
by moral sensibilities, passions and ancestral collective
memories, or that the decisions are not taken within a context
of historical or natural forces or a socio-cultural context -
only that none of these are determinate of the decision that
is made or of the action that follows. If an action is
rational, one cannot deduce that the action was the 'thing to
do' given the sensibilities, passions, beliefs of the agent or
the historical, natural and socio-cultural conditions of the
agent. Each influences the decision that is made and the
action that follows. How it does is an issue that we will
explore in the next chapters when we analyze rational
decisions and actions. But before we do, it is important to
understand non-rational actions that are moved by particular
moral sensibilities, passions and collective memories and
those that are said to be the products of historical, natural
or circumstantial forces.
Non-rational actions are not the same as irrational
behaviour. Non-rational actions have a close kinship with
rational actions. They follow a deliberative process in at
least three respects. Both are about events that are said to
be the responsibility of particular agents, whether individual
or collective. In both non-rational and rational actions, the
agents acknowledge the reasons for their actions; they
understand what they are saying and the goals they intend to
achieve. Thirdly, in both cases the agent is capable of
attempting to translate those goals into action.
Rational actions differ from nonrational actions in that
real choice is involved in a rational action. In a non-
rational action, the agent will say that s/he had no choice in
the matter. The agent had to do what s/he had to do. Though
from the observor or the historian's point of view, the
decision may be viewed as hypothetical because it is only if
the agent had those moral sensibilities, passions, or beliefs,
or only if the agent was "compelled" by those historical or
natural forces or environmental factors that the agent had to
decide what she or he decided. From the perspective of the
agent, the decision is categorical and not hypothetical. There
is an inner necessity; contingency is ruled out. The
convictions of the agent entail the decision.
Unfortunately, much of the work on the analysis of
rational explanation has been an attempt to reduce rational
action to a model of non-rational action in the sense that the
logic was reduced to one of necessary entailment.3 It does not
matter whether there is a probability relationship in the
judgement or not. What matters is whether the judgement itself
was logically entailed by the convictions of the agent. If it
was, then the action is non-rational, not rational.
In this chapter we will explore and analyze six versions
of nonrational decisions. Though we could begin by exploring
the six different formal models entailed by each position, we
will save this type of analysis for the next chapter. This
chapter will focus on a content analysis of these six
different perspectives. Further, we will explore them in
pairs rather than one at a time. The nonrational view which
primarily regards decisions as matters of moral sensibility
will be set alongside the perspective that treats such
decisions as impelled by the forces of history. The
nonrational perspective which regards reason as an instrument
to enact our passions will be contrasted with a view which
treats reason as an instrument to implement a nature common to
all humans, or at least, all mankind. Finally, the perspective
which regards reason as a particular way of thinking in
response to the collective memories of the society in which we
grew up, a collective memory forged either in the dramatic
moment of the birth of that society or by the particular
physical environment encountered by the society as it
developed, will be analyzed in the section on Historicism.
  
Moral and Patriotic Duty
When faced with a situation that resonates with memory
and recalls an historical period full of pain and remorse,
indeed, revulsion, then the thing to do might be to avoid, at
whatever cost, a recurrence of anything resembling such a
situation. "Conduct thy life and make thy commitments so as to
stay clear of conflict," might be the appropriate variation of
Kant's categorical imperative. Recollections of the Vietnam
war fed the fears of the anti-war party. They believed that
America was about to repeat that disaster a second time.
Morality and the horror of war itself determined a stance
which received an enormous boost when the charred bodies of up
to 400 civilians in the Baghdad suburb of Amiriya were removed
from a bomb shelter. They were killed when a laser-guided US
bomb penetrated the reinforced three-metre thick roof, a fact
which provided evidence for the American military that the
shelter was intended to protect military communications.
The position of President George Bush stood in stark
contrast to that of the anti-war party. Bush claimed that
American stood at "a defining hour".4 "We are engaged in a
great struggle in the skies and on the seas and sands...We are
Americans - part of something larger than ourselves." "What is
at stake is a big idea - a new world order." "We are the
nation that believes in the future. We are the nation that can
shape the future." "We are the only nation on this earth that
could assemble the forces of peace." 
Bush hit every note of the believer in patriotic duty.
First, the moment of the decision is depicted as a turning
point in history. Second, it is seen as part of a new emerging
historical order. "We can find meaning and reward by serving
some purpose higher than ourselves - a shining purpose, the
illumination of a thousand points of light." Third, it is
projected as a titanic struggle between those who uphold the
noble ideal of this future order and those who would spread
evil. "We had to stop Saddam now, not later...this brutal
dictator will do anything, will use any weapon, will commit
any outrage, no matter how many innocents must suffer."
Finally, America, and Bush as its leader are viewed as chosen
by history to carry the unique responsibility of leading the
historical forces of good against those of evil. Though a
moral posture, it is not one driven by moral sensibility but
one driven by an historical mission, a duty.
Behind the rational antagonists on either side who
debated whether military force ought or ought not to be
authorized, were the above non-rational rivals whose one area
of agreement was that debate was unnecessary. For one, the
consideration of the prospect of war should have been ruled
out a priori. For the other, it was the only and obvious thing
to do. The deliberations of Congress, though eventually
concurred in to help expedite the decision, was neither
legally required nor rationally necessary.
Sophocles' play Antigone provides the model for
understanding the stance of both non-rational groups and the
implications.5 In the drama the two antagonists are Creon and
Antigone. "Each of the protagonists has a vision of the world
of choice that forestalls serious practical conflict: each has
a simple deliberative standard and a set of concerns neatly
ordered in terms of this. Each, therefore, approaches problems
of choice with unusual confidence and stability; each seems
unusually safe from the damages of luck."6
Though both groups are akin in rejecting any
consideration of an alternative to their own viewpoint, they
differ in three fundamental respects. The war party of the
right honour and welcome the individual, "who did his best in
every way with his spear." The anti-war party of the left
honour and welcome the individuals who lay down their spears
and turn their backs on war. Secondly, the war party of the
right regard dereliction of public responsibility with shame.
The anti-war party of the left advocate conscientious
objection, blockage of buildings so federal civil servants
cannot do their jobs and continual protest against what they
regard as the failure of public authorities to do their moral
duty.7 Thus, while those who agonized over what decision to
make tolerate the protesters (though they become angry when
those potesters tie up bridges and highways and interfere with
the right of the common citizen to get on with his or her
life), the war party regards dissent as responsible only if it
occurs before the decision is made. Once made, everyone is
expected to fall into line to support the decision. Any other
behaviour is considered "reckless". If the leader of the war
party could get away with it, he would prosecute those who
trample on the flag, dishonour the symbols of state and show
disrespect to those with the responsibility of governing.
There is a third difference. The patriots8 believe in
power, believe that human ingenuity and resourcefulness can
overcome virtually any contingency, except the forces of
nature, of which the most formidable was death itself, and the
forces of history. Technological innovation is the best
security for sustaining the ship of state. "With remarkable
technological advances, like the Patriot missile," Bush
effused in his State of the Union Address, "we can defend
against missile attacks aimed at innocent civilians."
The reference to the Patriot missiles was not accidental.
Nor was Bush's visit to a Patriot missile factory the day
after the Iraqi bomb shelter was destroyed with the loss of
almost 400 children, women and men. The conflict abroad may
have been between one sense of Patriotic Duty and another, but
the domestic conflict was between two versions of morality,
between moral sensibility and moral duty. As Bush said near
the conclusion of his speech, "Our cause is just. Our cause is
moral. Our cause is right."
Three types of Patriots can be distinuished -
conservatives, reactionairies and extremists. Conservatives do
not believe they can ignore natural forces. The conservative
Patriots differ from the reactionairies in believing that they
also cannot diregard the forces of history. They evoke Otto
von Bismark's contention that man can neither create nor
direct the 'stream of time'. "He can only travel upon it and
steer with more or less skill and experience; he can suffer
shipwreck and go aground and also arrive in safe harbours."9
Reactionary Patriots believe they can direct history itself as
long as they follow the natural laws that govern the use of
force. Extremist Patriots believe they can ignore both natural
laws and historical forces for they serve a transcendental
cause. George Bush is a Conservative Patriot. Saddam Hussein
is an extremist one.
The most extreme version of a Creon, one who makes the
reactionairies and conservatives alike look like wimps, is the
extremist leader who also gives the appearance that he can
also command death itself. The individual by his command
murders not only other people with impunity, which Rozkolnikov
tried to do in Crime and Punishment, but in addition murders
thought and contention, orchestrates emotions and destroys
sensibilities. He not only risks the human world of his own
children as well as those of his enemy, but seems prepared to
destroy the natural world as well. Almost because he attempts
to go beyond the realm of good and evil itself, he is invested
with a macabre glamour by his followers. The murderer becomes
the prince of a black fairy tale with a mesmerizing effect on
his community who are transfixed by the leader's power over
life and death which makes that leader seem superhuman. His
stature is exaggerated by the popular honour given to a
perverse superior. He is a leader willing to destroy his own
nation and the surrounding environment. He is a leader who
places himself above the law and relishes casual sadism.10
Saddam Hussein, projects himself as the superpatriot of the
Arab cause.
Whatever the degree of symbolic patriotism in America,
and in spite of the fact that America can throw up a
conservative patriot, the American polis has not been built
upon the exaltation of the patriot. In the words of George
Washington, "We must take the passions of Men as Nature has
given them, and those principles as a guide which are
generally the rule of Action. I do not mean to exclude
altogether the Idea of patriotism. I know it exists, and I
know it has done much in the present Contest. But I will
venture to assert, that a great and lasting War can never be
supported on this principle alone. It must be aided by a
prospect of Interest or some reward."11 Most Americans may
support Bush but they don't idolize Patriots.
That does not mean there are not plenty of patriots in
the American public. The most poignant moment of the antiwar
film, "Born on the Fourth of July" occurs when the mother, out
of deep attachment to her husband, out of faith in America and
respect for the symbols of the state and, most of all, her
religion, turns her back on her son whom she has deeply and
truly loved and casts her crippled offspring, the Vietnam
veteran transformed into an angry war protester, out of the
house. Duty must come before filial affections. The bonds of
marriage, of state and religion are stronger than the ties
which bind a mother to her child. It is a melodrama, of
course, not a tragedy, for the parents never go through the
agony of understanding the errors of their 'ill-reasoning
reason', thought which only served to provide knee-jerk
responses to the call of duty, even if that duty meant the
crippling of their own son for an unjust cause. In a reversal
of the classical sex roles, the mother is Creon and the son
plays Antigone.
In contrast, the dissidents and protesters admire the
hero of "Dancing with Wolves". They turn their backs on the
madness of technology and the conquest that marches in its
stead. Harmony with nature, not conquest, is the supreme
value. Jacques Ellul, Ivan Illich, George Grant, Vera Franklin
- those who lament the direction of modernism - are their
gurus, for they have no heroes.
Nevertheless, in spite of the fundamental differences
between the patriots and the anti-war party, the stance of
both parties stands in stark contrast to the individual who
does not know what to do when faced with two alternatives,
both of which are unpleasant. Should we wait and let sanctions
work their course even though that will mean enormous
suffering to the Kuwaitis, the gradual devastation of their
country and unknown poltical repurcussions in the Arab world?
Or should we commit our military forces not knowing for sure
whether the casualty rate may be very high on both sides and
what the political fallout could be? There are arguments for
both sides. And s/he is unclear even of any of the rules or
norms for making such a decision. In the face of two
alternatives and knowing that the issue is very important, the
individual is confused. 
Not so Creon. In the play, Antigone. "Insoluble conflicts
cannot arise, because there is only a single supreme good, and
all other values are functions of that good."12 Just as Creon
identifies Athens with a ship which must be kept in tip-top
shape lest it flounder and its citizens become castaways or
refugees, so the American state began to be regarded by its
strongest patriots as a ship of state on which the individual
depended for his very life and being. For the patriotic
zealots, the state and the historical purposes it serves
become an end in itself; the state is not an instrument to
serve the commonweal.
It is against this sense of self-sacrifice, and the
contemporary conception of the state that accompanies it, that
the protesters burn flags, engage in sit-ins and demand
reversing the march to war. Law and power are identified with
violence and error. They are not satisfied to write words
disapproving the decision made. Direct action is required, for
their ethical consciousness must be made actual. They know
they won't stop or even inhibit this war. It is war in general
that they want to stop. The purpose of their action is to make
real their purpose. They can chain themselves to the fence of
military establishments. They can go limp and be dragged off
to prison to be "punished", a punishment they readily accept
for they claim to bear the guilt which the rest of us will not
acknowledge. "Because we suffer we acknowledge we have
erred."13
Going off to war is not brave and honourable, but a
matter of shame and dishonour. Insofar as the war is not
stopped, as long as the organized killing goes on, the evil
not only belongs to Saddam Hussein and his henchmen or Bush
and the military. We are forced to participate in it; it
becomes yours and mine. In the play, Antigone, there was a
war. There are two armies on either side. One appeals to the
homogeneity of the people, to their common religion and their
national brotherhood. The other, led by Creon, is a motley
collection and depends for its real strength on foreigners. In
Creon's terms, everyone on the other side of the line dividing
Iraq from the rest of the world is a foe, bad and unjust.
Everyone on his side, the Saudis, the Syrians, the Kuwaitis
who fled, becomes indiscriminately a friend and ally.
Antigone denies any distinction between those on either
side of the line in the Gulf. If she denies any real
differences, she creates a substitute disjunction. She draws
an imaginary circle which unites protesters in Germany, in
Britain, in Canada and in America. Those who join her to
protest against the war, not just its waste and ruthlessness
and destructiveness, are her sisters and brothers. Thus, the
Palestinians who protest the war in Amman (and cheer as the
Scuds head for Tel Aviv) become her sisters and brothers. She
forgets that she and the other protesters did not appear
before the Iraqi embassy when Saddam Hussein's troops marched
over Kuwait. It is a family feud, but Antigone turns the
conflict into a cosmological one of good versus evil. She does
not recognize that Hussein was not regarded as a member of the
family requiring a remonstration if not a demonstration. The
protest is rather directed at the head of the family, at
America, when Bush goes on the march.
This homogenization of the two sides is as true of those
who use their heads to advance the cause of their moral
sensibilities as those who use their bodies. Anatol Rapoport,
for example, questioned Robert Osgood's thesis that the
problem of war was, "How can the United States utilize its
military power as a rational and effective instrument of
national policy?"14 Rapoport's problem was not with the 'how'
but with the assumption of 'rationality" and the conception
that war was a mere 'instrument'. "The very notion of
'rational decision' dissolves into ambiguities and so loses
the meaning ascribed to it in other contexts."15
Rapoport takes as his paradigm problem the confrontation
between two superpowers in which the consequences of any
decision to go to war would be mutual annihilation.
Simultaneous disengagement from a confrontation (such as from
the Cuban missile crisis) is the only way to avoid
annihilation. The decision to disengage cannot, however, be
encapsulated by any model of rational decision making.
"Each knows that if he tries to disengage (e.g. turns his
back on his enemy), then he alone will be annhilated. Assuming
that mutual annhilation is preferred to only his own
annhilation, what is the 'rational thing' for each combatant
to do? 'Rationality' dictates against disengagement whether
the other disengages or not, since, if the other tries to
disengage, one can save oneself by annhilating the other with
impunity; if one does not try to disengage, it is suicide for
the other to do so. If, however, mutual disengagement is
preferred by both combatants to the continuation of this
combat, then the 'rational' choice by both actors prevents the
outcome preferred by both. What then does 'rationality' mean
in this context?"16
This dilemma in game theory, of course, depends upon
rationality being restricted to a strict calculation of
prudence in which the only value input is self-survival.
Further, it assumes that the only instruments available are
the extremes of war or turning one's back on war, when, in
fact, a whole range of alternatives are available, such as
tiny step by step processes of disengagement or,
alternatively, proxy wars and war fought with limited goals
and limited means whatever the capacities of either side.
Finally, it assumes equal power and the same goals by each
side.
However, a logical critique of this type is somewhat
unfair to Anatol Rapoport. For his main thrust is aimed at the
assumptions underlying the logic rather than the logic itself.
And the basic assumption behind assuming there must be reasons
for going to war, if it is necessary for a state to do so, is
the "determination to preserve the struggle for power as the
theoretical bedrock of political reality."17 The belief in the
struggle for power as the prime mover of politics is as
obsolete as the belief in the divine right of kings.
The issue is not the threat to Kuwait. The issue is not
the threat to world order and stability. When Antigone says,
"It is my nature to join in loving, not to join in hating,"
she captures the spirit of the love-ins of the sixties which
provided the foundation for the present anti-war movement. She
does not mean she feels love. Her love is pious not
passionate. For no intimacy or personal affection is entailed.
The love is generalized and dispersed. It floats above the
body rather than rooting itself in the groin. It is as asexual
as the feelings of those who, out of such deep love for
America and her economic interests, also do not endorse the
decision to go to war.
"Antigone structures her entire life and her vision of
the world in accordance with this simple, self-contained
system of duties."18  The particularities of the case or of the
various positions are irrelevant. There is no personal
commitment to promises made and broken, to allies versus
enemies. It is not the individuality of the person or the
situation that brings forth the sacrifice. The contradictions
in her own position can be ignored. In the anti-war cause,
spouses can be neglected and children can be conscripted who
cannot yet think through the issues. There is a ruthless and
impersonal simplification of duty and she is its singular
author. It is a product of personal conscience with no
responsibility to follow a collective decision.
But to what is her duty really directed in the name of a
higher piety? The dead. She identifies with the corpse of her
brother. She identifies with all those who have been victims
of war. The Conservative Patriot recognizes that leadership
requires sacrifices, but he honestly tries to minimize them.
The Reactionary Patriot will put no such bounds on those
sacrificed, provided it ensures and serves to uphold the old
order in resistance to the forces of history. Rather than one
devoted to a way of life which gives freedom and happiness to
the people and sometimes asks for sacrifice in defence of that
way of life, his is a devotion to a reified life, a life
frozen in time, to repression and order.
But it is the extremist version of Creon, Saddam Hussein, who
is the real necrophiliac. He worships at the altar of
cemetaries and dead bodies, at Memorial parades when the flags
will wave, when honour will be recognized and glory given its
due. He is willing to sacrifice anyone and anything provided
it serves his mission, not to serve history, not to preserve a
way of life, but to serve a transcendent cause and his own
glory. The extremist would turn himself into god.
So Creon and Antigone are really two sides of the same
coin. They are synergistically interdependent. Both give
unthinking loyalty and devotion to gods of their own
invention. The one serves the god of aggressive exploitation
in the name of spit and polish. The other's duty is more
ethereal and other-worldy in devotion and ready sacrifice to a
promised land of perpetual peace where the wolves will lie
down beside the lambs and do them no harm. In Creon, there is
only civic duty; in Antigone, there is no civic duty. Both
ignore the real needs of the citizens whom they readily
sacrifice on their complementary altars of duty. Both follow
unwritten laws inscribed either in their hearts or in history
rather than such a mundane entity as the written constitution
and the laws of Congress.
Nevertheless, Antigone clearly occupies the higher moral
ground. For Antigone sacrifices herself for her cause. Creon
would sacrifice the members of society, and, in Saddam
Hussein's extremist version, all the members and indeed
society itself, in dedication to flag and country and the
cause. Antigone remains vulnerable and commands our pity and
our concern; she awakens our conscience. Creon projects
invulnerability and commands respect but not affection.
This does not mean that Antigone's position is not
riddled with contradictions. Quite the reverse as indicated
above. While driven apoplectic by the rhetoric of George Bush
in presenting the conflict as a war of "good against evil"19
or, as Harold Pinter phrased it, America is "asserting what it
conceives to be its spiritual destiny - I am God, get out of
my fucking way"20, the anti-war movement portrays the war, not
as a mistake in judgement, but as a product of evil intent, of
evil norms and one which will result in the most horrid
consequences to the people of Iraq, to the infrastructure of
Iraq, to the allied soldiers in the field, and most of all, to
the ecology of the region and this earth. John Pilger, an
Australian war reporter, even excoriates Bush for tricking
Hussein into invading Kuwait. When Hussein makes war and
devastates Kuwait, we find background noise and misbehaviour.
However, when that war is initiated for whatever reason and
for whatever cause by a family member who will leave another
family member's corpse on the field of battle, then war is
universally evil.
The homogenization of the evil of conflict not only
ignores the way the war was initiated, but seems to take no
account that Hussein had built up the largest secret arsenal
of chemical and biological weapons which he had shown a clear
willingness to use preemptively. He is renowned as the one
clear and unequivocal violator of chemical weapons treaties.
He was clearly intent on building a nuclear capability as
well. He had an abysmal record of human rights violations. He
was bred in the extremist Baathist ideology of Arab
triumphalism, that mixture of distorted Nietzschean 'will to
power', Alfred Rosenberg racism, state socialism and pan-
nationalism that is so endemic to fascism. To that situation,
Hussein brought his own brand of bully boy tactics and
opportunism, a personal and party history which did little to
diminish his appeal to the dispossessed and the downtrodden as
they were inspired and driven by hate rather than hope, by
propaganda rather than an exchange of views, and, most of all,
by the intimidation of an all-pervasive secret police
apparatus.
Rational Scepticism
If the patriots and the moralists question the need for
deliberation in making a decision about war and need not
undertake any deliberation themselves to know what to do
because they know what is right, sceptics question the alleged
'rationality' that goes into such a decision because they
raise questions about whether any decision to go to war or not
to go to war can be fundamentally rational. Decisions to go to
war are either driven by our interests (acquisitive interests
that is) or driven by the need to protect oneself from the
passions of others. In neither case is it a moral decision at
all. In both cases, there is a universal factor to account for
all human behaviour.
When the France of Louis XIV was in decline, when the
pall of the War of the Spanish Succession and the exhaustion
it spread to pollute the atmosphere of France gave cause for
Frenchmen to look into their minds and hearts, it produced a
different kind of revolt against the power politics of the
seventeenth century. It also produced a new intellectual
outlook. The search was on for the universal causes of all war
quite independently of which individual ruled.
If Antigone and Creon were true believers, Thomas
Jefferson and Alexander Hamilton were true disbelievers.
Thomas Jefferson did not trust non-Americans. Alexander
Hamilton did not trust the passions of Americans themselves
which threatened to beome a zealous driving force rather than
one guided by the calculations of reason. That distrust
focused on others when they expressed in their words and deeds
passions and ambitions much more powerful than one's own and
threatened the realization of one's own passions. Thomas
Jefferson would have opposed the use of military force as the
founder and architect of the isolationist tradition in
America. Hamilton would have supported the war, not because it
was America's destiny to fulfill an historical mission, but
because Saddam's unbridled ambition was far more dangerous
than America's, and the control of a key portion of the
world's oil resources could not be allowed to fall into Saddam
Hussein's hands.
It was Hamiltonian rather than Jeffersonian thought that
allowed (not propelled) America to become involved in the Gulf
War. The roots of this thesis are to be found in the
scepticism of David Hume and his contention that reason has no
influence on our passions and action. Reason was incapable of
yielding practical judgements. "Moral distinctions...are not
the offspring of reason. Reason is wholly inactive, and can
never be the source of so active a principle as conscience, or
a sense of morals."21 Reason was instrumental only in directing
passion to its objective or selecting the means to achieve the
objective. It was the passions, not our economic interests,
that set the goals and the norms by which those goals were to
be persued. Just as for Jefferson where reason was
instrumental, but directed towards advancing interests, reason
in this model was also instrumental, but as the servant of the
passions. Further, "the ultimate ends of human actions can
never, in any case, be accounted for by reason."22
Alexander Hamilton in the first Federalist Paper stated
that man's reasons could disguise his causes. "Hamilton
believed that politics and society can be brought under man's
control by knowing the laws of human behaviour based on such
universal theorems as cause and effect and means and ends."23
Hamilton drew directly from Hume the conviction that a theory
of human nature, the understanding of the constants underlying
motives and intentions, could provide a 'rational' explanation
of human behaviour. It also meant that order was not the
result of rational, voluntary submission to the authority of
the state; habitual deference and submission was.
The consequence of this in international affairs is that
the powers that win the wars usually lose the peace by an
excess of passionate ardor that overrules prudent judgement.
Wars which are begun with justice, and even from necessity,
"have always been pushed too far from obstinancy and
passion."24 In addition, Britain had another problem in the
seventeenth century which paralled that of the United States
in the current conflict. "Our allies ...always reckon upon our
forces as their own and, expecting on war at our expense,
refuse all reasonable terms of accommodation."25 There is a
third pitfall which the United States would have been well to
heed in the Vietnam war. "To mortgage our revenues at so deep
a rate in wars where we are only accessories was surely the
most fatal delusion that a nation which had any pretension to
politics and prudence has ever yet been guilty of."26
The lesson is clear. It is not the rational calculations
that we have to attend to primarily, but the excess of the
passions. Because all humans are susceptible to precisely the
same feelings, and, in all nations in any age, the same
circumstances give rise to the same passions ("in all nations
and ages the same objects still give rise to pride and
humility"27), the knowledge of these constant constituents in
human nature, these "regular springs" which are unaffected by
history or the differences between societies, allow the
observor to use reason to keep the passions within bounds. For
Thomas Jefferson, these regular springs were our interests.
For Alexander Hamilton they were our passions. For Thomas
Jefferson, that understanding dictated an avoidance of
overseas wars unless America's financial interests were
involved. For Alexander Hamilton, it would probably have
determined American involvement to counter the excessive
ambitions of Saddam Hussein, though it would have also put us
on guard lest our own ambitions exceed our capacities.
For Thomas Jefferson, the well-being of the America was
the only thing which was intrinsically good. Though Thomas
Jefferson would have liked to reform the international system,
it was unlikely if not impossible. War was the natural state
for the rest of the world. A committment to reform would
eventually entail a commitment to intervention and, in turn,
resort to the guns of war. The only thing good without
qualification and committed to justice was America. An ocean
of fire separated America from the rest of the world. The
self-interst of America was the highest good to be persued
with steadfastness, determination and an unwavering will.28 
Thomas Jefferson might appear to be in precisely the same
camp as Antigone, not simply for opposing the war, but because
of his purported moral sensibility. He regarded virtue as "a
love of others, a sense of duty to them, a moral
instinct...which prompts us irresistably to feel and to succor
their distresses".29 But his moral responsibility was quite
unlike that of Antigone's. Those others to whom he felt a
sense of duty were Americans. Jefferson was not a
humanitarian.
Don't intervene. Let the corpse of Kuwait remain in the
world's public square not to be redeemed by the United States.
Thomas Jefferson and George Washington's principles were still
operative in the small remnant of the isolationist camp who
opposed the war. "It must be unwise in us to implicate
ourselves by artificial ties in the ordinary vicissitudes of
her (substitute  Arabs for European) politics, or the ordinary
combinations and collisions of her friendships or enmities.
Our detached and distanced situation invites and enables us to
pursue a different course."30
 America is an exemplar to the world, not its policeman.
Commerce with all. Alliance with none. Abjure foreign
entanglements. Jefferson did experiment with commercial
coercion, participating in an economic embargo from 1807 to
1809, so enraged was he at the British interference with the
neutrality of American shipping. But that was in defense of
the only single intrinsic good - the United States of America
and its preoccupation with business.
This was not an argument for selfishness. Quite the
reverse. It was an argument for self-sacrifice, but the
highest entity worthy of personal self sacrifice was America
and not Kuwait which had voted almost as often against the
United States as the USSR and could be considered an enemy of
the state even if America had never been at war with Kuwait.
What drove all men was their interest in property, owning
and controlling as much as they could. Humans were inherently
possessive individualists and reason was the instrument to
advance that self-interest. If America went to war, America
would pay the costs and Germany and Japan, America's main
economic rivals, who, unlike the United States, were dependent
on the Middle East for the importation of the bulk of their
oil, would benefit.
Just as there was nothing in Jefferson's mental make-up
to oppose war per se, there was nothing inherent in Alexander
Hamilton's to support war. Both measured the circumstances in
terms of their own convictions about the nature of man and the
world. There are in fact sceptics of the Hamiltonian school
who would certainly have opposed the war if it threatened to
bring about a superpower confrontation.
Thomas Jefferson had introduced a critique of traditional
state relations - that the struggle between states was not a
struggle for power, since states were not governed by the
quest for power, but simply the duty to protect their own
economic interests. Thus, for John Adams, foreign alliances
were merely matters of agreements on trade and navigation.31
Though John Adams, when he joined Ben Franklin in Paris,
complained that his fellow countryman was the "Don Juan of
diplomacy" and that his social relations and flirtations with
the Parisian ladies32 were interfering with his diplomatic
responsibilities, and though John Adams was recalled by
Congress for offending the French Foreign Minister, the two
Americans agreed on the goals and strategy of diplomacy; they
merely disagreed on the tactics. Though Franklin titillated
the matrons of France with hugs and kisses and "amities
amoureuses", he played the international political game with a
relatively open deck, in stark contrast to the older
traditions of devious diplomacy, a precedent that marked the
American style ever afterward.33 But his goal was identical to
Adams, to ensure the survival and future growth of America and
the protection of her commercial interests. And he was clearly
successful. His obtaining continued financial and military
assistance meant that at Yorktown there were more French than
Americans fighting when Cornwallis surrendered to General
Washington. The Franklin "new diplomacy" not only made victory
possible, but it set a precedent for the American role when it
became the dominant partner assisting other struggling
regimes.34
Historicism
If the Humean sceptics stress the passions which use
reason as an instrument, and the Lockeans stress economic
interests which also utilize reason as an instrument,
historicists stress forces in history which use the passions
and calculations of humans for their own purposes. Individual
interests and passions do not command history. Rather, the
forces of history reduce the petty ambitions and self-serving
schemes of the politicians to insignificance.
In this concern with the Spirit of History rather than
the rational calculations of any individual, it must be
remembered that, "Spirit is not the life that shrinks from
death and keeps itself untouched by devastation, but rather
the life that endures it and maintains itself in it. It wins
its truth only when, in utter dismemberment, it finds
itself...Spirit is this power only
by looking the negative in the face, and tarrying with it."35
When George Bush depicted the Gulf War as America's 'defining
time', he sounded like an historicist, but it was all sound
without meaning. For from the historicist perspective, the
individual does not command history; history commands the
individual. The historical agent is not in control of the
future trying to steer the ship of state in the right
direction; the past sweeps the agent of history into the
future in ways he is not nor cannot be aware. The great
historical figures, such as Napoleon or the Founding Fathers,
may serve to usher in a new age, but they are not the golden
Californian or Australian surf boarders with their gleeming
white smiles riding the crest of the wave; they are more akin
to the dour, pasty-faced haunted Abraham Lincoln who entered
war not 'to kick ass' but very sensitive to the fact that the
war would be "the terrible historical tragedy of our time".
The war is not a conflict between good and evil, but one which
arises out of the contradictions of America. If the historical
hero is one who does not shrink from death, but tries to
remain untouched by the devastation that surrounds him in
order that he may maintain his equanimity and not crumble to
dust, as President Lyndon Johnson
did, his wisdom carries with it a profound and overwhelming
melancholy, what Herman Melville called "the fine hammered
steel of woe." For man is but history's instrument incapable
of comprehending its meaning at the time.
George Bush wanted to rewrite the script for the Vietnam
war as the heroic Second World War battle against Hitler as
the repository of evil. But he wanted to do it without
sacrifice, with the cost of as few American lives as possible.
From an historicist perspective, war is not a great epic of
victory, but a tragedy whose meaning is realized through
sacrifice. George Bush wanted to fight a war that embodied
moral purity in imitation of the idol of America, who happens
to have the same first name. As one of the characters depicts
George Washington in Henry Adams' novel Democracy, "We
idolized him. To us he is Morality, Justice, Duty, Truth."36
George Washinton had been made into a Roman God with his face
inscribed on the side of Mount Vernon. George Bush had the
same ambition. He did not want to go down in history as a
wimp, or as a Johnsonian figure of farce in the face of
tragedy. There was no sense that there was an alternative way
to face war, to accept it as a tragedy rather than a moment of
glory, to recognize and face that tragedy with steely reserve
rather than deny it. For George Bush, the spirit of America
was "indominatable". There was no recognition that Americans
were fighting that war because they,
with the Germans and others, had sewn its seeds with their
immoral military and industrial sales to a Vulcan of evil.
Creon's responsibility is only to his image of the civil
society, to the secular civil religion of America. For Creon,
you stand tall and straight when you worship at the feet of
the gods of war. When you worship before the spirit of God
whose will pervades history and is revealed by that history,
you humble yourself, you recognize you cannot fathom the
meaning and you acknowledge that something in your own soul,
in the soul of America, carried you into this war.
War is not just an instrument separate from the ends it
serves as if it has no impact on our lives and our
consciousness. War is a furnace of transformation. Secondly, 
paradoxes could be revealed in any rational calculus to go to
war. For the sceptics, it entailed understanding the basis for
war in the passions of men. For the historicists, it entailed
understanding the war from the perspective of its historical
forces and the significance of those forces. War was a
critical node in understanding and comprehending continuity
and change in history.
Giambattista Vico wrote about this new science of history
in 1744.37 The point of capturing the internal dynamic of
thought was not simply to fix the pattern of thinking of the
individual or even of the group, but to determine the way of
thinking that is so important to determining the course of
action of a nation. For such an interpretation, while focused
on what is particular to one decision of one group or even of
a nation in a very specific crisis in time, is concerned with
grasping what is eternal in that process, what it says about
humans, their politics and the way they govern their lives.
This is particularly true if what we are grasping is not the
thoughts of a bully-boy, however clever, seeking to establish
his own glory in history, but the process of thinking,
reflection and decision making of a nation on the frontier of
time. Through understanding that process, we can begin to
define the ideal while immersed in a very concrete situation
and a very specific culture. It is not a transcendent ideal,
but an ideal which emerges and is defined by what transpires
in significant transition points in history and which in turn
helps to account for and allows us to understand the
significance of those decisions. What the historian is out to
discover is the 'idea' that has revealed itself in its
clearest light. In sum, the internal thought processes of an
individual are but clues to the life of a nation which gives
that nation its unity and coherence and which in turn provides
a torch for others on the direction of the path of history.
For example, Quincy Wright, the dean of modern studies of
international relations, in both his original work, A Study of
War (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1942), and in the
work that capped his career, The Study of International
Relations (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1955), argued
that international relations was not so much a product of the
struggle between states per se, but the arena in which states
acted out the personalities and capacities of the society.
National policy was a product of competing interest groups,
the personalities of the leaders, technological capacity,
resource availability, social structures and last but
definitely not least, national values.
The vision that foreign affairs was not driven primarily
by power or commercial interests, but was the product of
acting out internal conflicts and values can go even further
in irrational rather than non-rational explanations. In the
works of researchers such as Bernard Fensterwald, Jr., an
individual's attitude towards foreign relations could be
directly correlated with attitudes toward child raising,
punishment of sex offenders, etc.38 War was not so much an
expression of an external power or economic struggles as the
acting out of internal power struggles within the society and
within the individual. War is then a product of the
irrationality, contradictions and conflicts within the society
and the individual. Thus, for example, Arthur Gladstone argued
that our conception of the enemy was more a product of
projection than of objective analysis.39
Game theorists, like Thomas Schelling40, argued that
rational players were influenced by various factors unrelated
to the balance of power and John Harsanyi extended that
critique to Schelling himself to demonstrate that the very
fact that they were influenced by such irrelevant factors
represented irrational behaviour.41
In a nonrational historicist account, the ideas that infuse
and direct the collective memory of Americans must be unpacked
if we are to understand why Congress decided to use military
force in Iraq. But even these ideas can be construed as
irrational rather than nonrational.
Men and women come to the United States Congress imbued
with a strong sense of American history and the place of
America in the world. They have been generally taught to
celebrate that history. If one is pessimistic about democracy
and the role of history one can attribute such beliefs to the
mythology that infuses the education of an American. "The
first function of the founders of nations, after the founding
itself, is to devise a set of true falsehoods about origins -
a mythology - that will make it desirable for nationals to
continue to live under common authority, and, indeed, make it
impossible for them to entertain contrary thoughts...Americans
reckoned values in the marketplace and by consensus, unlike
the Europeans, who reckoned them through traditional
institutions and by absolute standards. Now, one of the
peculiarities of the American way is that when contests of
ideas arise, the view held by the winning side comes in time
to be regarded as the unqualified truth, the only possible
view; indeed, all subsequent battles must begin with the
outcomes of earlier battles as unquestioned premises."42
Like many American intellectuals who respond with
revulsion and rejection of much of the jingoism that is part
of America, it has become a commonplace to disparage the
America of the late twentieth century, to smile slyly at her
economic decline, to attend critically to the hypocrisy that
imbues American action, not to see through it, but to gorge in
self-satisfaction and self-righteousness in a refusal to
identify with that which is American.
This was not always the case. Alexis de Tocqueville, who also
remarked that, "Nothing is more embarrassing in the ordinary
intercourse of life than this irritable patriotism of the
Americans,"43 also noted that the patriotism of all, however
distasteful, was preferable to the government of the few.
Tocqueville also stated that although, "The men who are
entrusted with the direction of public affairs in the United
States are frequently inferior," and although, "They may
frequently be faithless and frequently mistaken...they will
never systematically adopt a line of conduct hostile to the
majority; and they cannot give a dangerous or exclusive
tendency to the government."44
Is that generalization true any longer? Has the American
Congress embarked on a dangerous course which is simply the
continuation of Pax Americana in a new dress, an imperial
America, an America focussed on policing the world while its
traditional pride in the centre of its concerns and
excellence, commerce, spirals downwards? Tocqueville also
remarked that he knew, "of no other country in which there is
so little independence of mind and real freedom of discussion
as in America."45 Though Tocqueville observed America and
gathered his notes in the heyday of Jacksonian populism when
"democracy has been abandoned to its wild instincts" and no
resources were allocated to the support of an independent
intellectual class, the question remains relevant. Did the
debate indicate a lack of intellectual independence? Was the
discussion restricted in any way. If so, what do those
restrictions indicate?
The restrictions do not have to be externally imposed.
After World War II, a war in which America broke out of its
isolationism, the intellectuals of America looked inward and
took a different tack than the self-confident celebration of
progress of Jackson Turner and Charles Beard and Vincent Louis
Parrington. For their historicism was optimistic rather than
pessimistic, goal directed rather than caught up in the
unfathonable depth of the world historical spirit,
teleological and future directed rather than
focused on the past to understand the present. It was an
historicism imbued with the vision of progress and America as
its leader in the triumph of freedom and liberty for all
mankind. After WW II, this outward looking historicism was
replaced by which gazed inwardly at the soul of America.
Tocqueville, for one, was rediscovered. The concept of
national character was again a matter of concern.46 Louis Hartz
of Harvard, in his classic study, The Liberal Tradition in
America (1955), concurred with Toqueville that the liberal
tradition was so uniform, so all pervasive, so unchallenged in
America that political debate was little more than
shadowboxing. Daniel Boorstin of Chicago, in The Genius of
American Politics (1953) and The Americans: The Colonial
Experience (1958), agreed by seconding the second observation
of Toqueville concerning the mediocrity of America. The United
States had produced a homogeneous and undifferentiated society
which was the source of its stability but which also produced
a wet blanket on dissent. Americans had gone out to see the
world and found their own society wanting.
This was not in a period of post-Vietnam blues, of a
shift in economic prospects from the wealthiest to the most
indebted nation. These books were published when America was
at the pinnacle of its power, but also at a time when
corporate executives were portayed as clones in grey flannel
suits.47 Edmund S. Morgan in The Birth of the Republic, 1763-
1789, and his intellectual successor, Bernard Bailyn in
Ideological Origins of the American Revolution (1967), found
this conservativism rooted in the inherited Puritan values and
the Lockean intellectual traditions that the Americans had
brought with them from England. Whereas John C. Miller in the
Origins of the American Revolution (1943) had portrayed the
genesis of the American polis as the beginning of a perpetual
revolution and a tension between the Whigs who had "aspired to
step into the shoes of the former Tory aristocrats and to rule
the masses in the name of the rich, the wise, and the good"48
and a revolutionary democratic tide, the new postwar
historians were pessimistic about revolution, democracy and
progress. Though some celebrated that pessimism precisely
because they were opposed to revolution and believed that the
Americans, of all the world's peoples, are, "the most
materialistic and most vulgar and least disciplined" but had
surprisingly produced "a governmental system adequate to check
the very forces they unleashed"49 in the American revolution,
they were one with the Whig, progressive and radical
historians in viewing America as a place of intellectual
mediocrity and repressiveness.
The above historians drew their insights into the
American character from the American Revolution, "the central
event in American history,"50 usually interpreted as the period
which expresses what is best and most permanent in the
American spirit.
"The strength and future of a republic depends upon its
capacity for periodic self-renewal through the reaffirmation
of the pristine ideals that once inspired it. A republic owes
its meaning to the act of founding, to the historical 'moment'
of its creation."51
But was that birth based on a pristine ideal or a trauma which
instilled in Americans a basic neuroses? "The fate of a
nation, like that of a person, may be the working out of the
traumas of early childhood, the outcome of some basic
character defect."52 the history of a country may be the
process of tracing the roots of a recurrent neurotic pattern
of behaviour which inhibits and distorts rationality. Other
historians rooted the deformities of America in its
development rather than locating them in America's roots. In
either case, they would produce explanations of irrationality,
not non-rational explanations.
If some historians found a restrictive liberalism and
others a narrow religious and intellectual economic
conservativism, still others told a tale of decline and fall
before America had evinced any of the external manifestations
that are so widely discussed throughout the newspapers and
magazines of the world. William A. Williams (The Contours of
American History, 1961) of the University of Wisconsin, a neo-
Marxist, depicted the emergence of an American capitalist
oligarchy running America for their own interests and at the
expense of the vast majority of Americans. There were two
American minds, not one. Richard Hofstadter (Age of Reform,
1955) pictured the progressives and reformers as inept
failures and Henry May (The End of American Innocence, 1959)
traced the institutionalization of that failure and sell-out
in the destruction of previously inherited values brought
about by the First World War. It was as if the guilt and
despondency that had previously been viewed as the predominant
self-image of the American south (C. Vann Woodward, The Burden
of Southern History, 1960) had crept through the whole fabric
of America.
This was before the disaster of Vietnam. These books were
written before the Bay of Pigs fiasco and before the Cuban
missile crisis. But they were written under the shadow of the
nuclear bomb, in the chill of the cold war and the aftermath
of McCarthy.  What a contrast these views were with the
visions that inspired the American revolution and which have
pervaded American belief systems, when America was viewed as
"the protector and propagator of liberty everywhere" and "the
cause of America is in a great measure the cause of all
mankind,"53 the sentiments George Bush echoed in his State of
the Union Address on January 29, 1991.
"For two centuries, America has served the world as an
inspiring example of freedom and democracy. For
generations, America has led the struggle to preserve and
extend the blessings of liberty. And today, in a rapidly
changing world, Americans know that leadership brings
burdens, and requires sacrifice.
"But we also know why the hopes of humanity turn to us.
We are Americans; we have a unique responsibility to do the
hard work of freedom. And when we do, freedom works."54
That work 'defined the state of our union'. Bush declared
unequivocally that 'America served the world as an inspiring
example of freedom and democracy'.
R.R. Palmer, who celebrated the origins of America as a
remarkable revolution in the cause of freedom and
instantiating the principle that sovereignty belonged to the
people (The Age of Democratic Revolution: A Political History
of Eyrope and America, 1769-1800, 1959) (Bush repeatedly
referred to 'the people' as the source of American strength),
however, agreed with other postwar historians that the flame
of revolution and dedication to freedom had been frozen in
time as a nostalgic memory rather than a dynamic force in the
life of America.
From this inversion of the American self-image, the
picture became worse and worse as historians delved into
issues of slavery, treatment of the working classes, of women
and of native Americans.
Instead of a picture of a bland, conformist, repressive,
somewhat mediocre America, the underbelly of American society
began to be painted by the historians. John Howe in his
article, "Republican Thought and the Political Violence of the
1790's"55 suggested that the conformity was both ideological
and deeply imbued with violence. He pictured it as "a
peculiarly volatile and crisis-ridden ideology, one with
little resilience, little margin for error, little tradition
of success behind it, and one that was vulnerable both
psychologically and historically. Within this context,
politics was a deadly business, with little room for optimism
and leniency."56 It was a society that was testy, trigger
happy, venemous, abusive, malevolent, brutal with a low flash-
point and quick to resort to arms to resolve disputes, as the
Civil War seemed to confirm. The reference to democracy and
the rule of law is all empty rhetoric. The motives, intentions
and integrity of opponents were not simply distrusted; they
were assumed to to be the worst. America sees Saddam Hussein
as a Creon because a Creon lives in the core of the American
soul. It is the savage strain in America, reflected in its
politics as well as its literature.57
What was behind this violent temper in American politics?
An inborn insecurity, for one thing. Underlying the bullying
image of America that is so pervasive, an America that invades
Grenada and Panama, is what underlies any bully, a fear, a
deep fear that enemies abound and surround America and,
secondly a deep fear that America was not strong enough to
hold together. For the essence of America was commerce, but
what held it together was virtue, which included a sense of
public responsibility, of integrity, of frugality, of
industry, of honesty. When the passions were unreigned,
selfish greed and anarchic competition in the devotion to
wealth and luxury undermined those virtues and threatened the
future of the republic. As Thomas Paine noted in Common Sense,
"commerce diminishes the spirit both of patriotism and
military defence."58 Periods of rapid growth and economic
expansion are followed by superego attacks and moral self-
flaggelation that quickly seeks out another real target for
physical abuse because that other is a threat to America.
In the eighties, American citizens witnessed what Martin
Mayer entitled, The Greatest-Ever Bank Robbery: The Collapse
of the Savings and Loan Industry. With government guarantees,
the public treasury had been looted by commercial lawlessness,
financial and legal skullduggery, by foxes who had been
allowed into the chicken coop, by cartels of corrupt
professionals who paid lip service to 'market forces' for a
windfall that would accumulate to over a $500 billion cost to
the American taxpayer to the benefit of its better off
citizens whose deposits of up to $100,000 plus accrued
interest per account (not per individual) were insured fully
by the government, including the ill-gotten gains of drug
traffickers. Unlike previous periods of excessive greed, the
public underwrote the whole scam. We observed a unique
innovation, the creation of welfare criminalism. America had
just gone through its worst period of moral decadence based on
excessive and lawless greed. It was an era in which the greedy
had become heroes. Crooks, swindlers and charlatans were seen
as models to emulate. It was a decade of an Orwellian
capitalist world in which losses were presented as profits,
liabilities became assets and assets were valued on the basis
of projected incomes in the best of all possible worlds in the
guise of traditional conservative financing. It was a period
in which the virtues of economic risk were celebrated by the
American President just as the controllers of the economic
levers of government removed any risk element by investors and
homogenized wildly speculative banking practices with prudent
investment policies.
Whether virtue resides in government provided it
expresses the will of the people and embodies that will, and
vice in commerce, or, alternatively, whether it is government
that is the embodiment of vice and virtue is attributed to
money, whether one values the power and stability of the state
in the tradition of Hamilton and Madison or the autonomy and
freedom of the individual in the tradition of Jefferson and
Paine, these two positions have formed the alternating poles
of the American self-conception. Ironically, it is the
populist who most trusts the collective value of individual
greed, while the defender of representative government sees
the wickedness of greed when it is institutionalized in banks
and the virtue of government when it serves high principle.
Reagan and Bush may both be Republicans, but they belong to
opposite orders of thought. Reagan followed the rhetoric of
Thomas Paine. "Society is produced by our wants, and
government by our wickedness; the former promotes our
happiness positively by uniting our affections, the latter
negatively by restraining our vices."59 Only Reagan, in what
Hofstadter called "a democracy of cupidity", used government
to promote wickedness and to allow private vice to proceed
unrestrained. "The Age of Reagan ... saw the wholesale and
institutional disenfranchisement of memory as a governing
principle in our institutional life."60 Contrast this with
Jefferson's view that while the state's prime function was the
defence of acquisitiveness, there was a danger that it would
become a tool of those who already acquired wealth rather than
the defender of everyone's right to do so. For Jefferson,
"Banking establishments are more dangerous than standing
armies."
American historians of a more conservative bent began to
read acquisitiveness as not simply a danger that needed to be
bounded, but as a foundation with the seeds of its own
destruction as the acquisition of wealth replaced the desire
to produce goods and the nation sunk into a morass of
materialism without any redeeming virtue. The state could not
be relied upon to impose the restraint needed to control the
greed of the individual, for the state could be and has been
coopted in service of that greed. Further, the deeper
religious tradition rooted in a belief in original sin and the
corruptibility of man which previously was relied upon to
control vice no longer seemed to be active in the American
polity. The disappearance of that deeper religious tradition,
the Protestant Calvinist roots of America in contrast to its
liberal foundation, a religious concept of virtue which
demanded that Americans be suspicious of themselves, was
offered as an explanation for the unboundaried indulgence of
greed, even before that excess expressed itself in the rampant
corruption of the eighties.61
If Jefferson viewed the state as a necessary evil to
protect the acquisitive realm, a state which became virtuous
by limiting the excesses of that realm and setting it on the
course of higher purpose, Adams, another founding father, put
it more positively and saw the state as governed by the love
of power, but power in the service of freedom operating by
challenging the power of anyone within the country or outside
who chose to use power to limit another's freedom. "The same
principle in human nature - that aspiring, noble principle
founded in benevolence, and cherished by knowledge: I mean the
love of power, which has been so often the cause of slavery, -
has, whenever freedom has existed, been the cause of freedom.
If it is this principle that has always prompted the princes
and nobles of the earth, by every species of fraud and
violence to shake off all limitations of their power, it is
the same that has always stimulated the common people to
aspire at independency, and to endeavour at confining the
power of the great within the limits of equity and reason."62
Power in the service of freedom may be viewed as as
instrument to define limits for those who would infringe on
freedom, but this very vision itself may be interpreted as a
mode of acting out internal tensions and conflicts. If, as
Barrington Moore Jr. depicts it63, class societies ridden with
antagonism between the rulers and the ruled, feudal and
industrial classes, keep social peace in some cases (Germany
and Japan) by a compact between the old landed aristocracies
and the new capitalist classes and export their mutual hatred
onto convenient scapegoats and an aggression towards the rest
of the world, then America, torn as it is either by a new type
of class warfare64 or by a conflict between virtue and greed,
between the politics of the heart and the politics of the gut,
may also be acting out those tensions in aggression towards an
enemy and the stooges of that enemy within the body politic of
the United States of America.
Perhaps that is why America's aggressive rhetoric and
actions externally and internally, whenever they fear the
republic is threatened, can be reconciled with the picture
Richard Hofstadter gives in a book published almost fifteen
years later than the one mentioned above, The Idea of a Party
System (1969). The vision he depicts is an America of
boundaried debate and accomodation in a determination to make
sure that differences do not lead to an unravelling of the
state. America is a civil society in the political realm and
an uncivil one in what is normally the civil realm, commerce,
precisely because the violence that lies just beneath the
surface of the civil realm cannot be allowed to permeate the
political one lest the state be torn to pieces. Hence, the
cultivation of virtue that is the hallmark of the American
politician when he is not exercising his greed. Hence the
expression of that virtue through calculation and guile to
coopt the opposition, a practice which dated back to Thomas
Jefferson. Bush, in his 1991 State of the Union address, was
applauded loudly when he depicted America as a country that
'resolutely confronts evil for the sake of good'. The rough
and tumble of parliamentary question period, the posturing
pomposity of much that goes for parliamentary debate, are not
integral to the American system. Acerbity belonged to rhetoric
but not to divisive action. As Jefferson enunciated the
principle, once an issue is decided, all unite behind it for
the common good.65 Senator Mitchell and Biden, who had led the
opposition to authorizing the use of military force against
Iraq, echoed precisely those sentiments immediately after Bush
completed his State of the Union address to rally all of
America to back 'our young men and women dedicated to serving
the cause of freedom in the Gulf'. As they had said earlier,
in deciding issues in the face of a crisis, each American is
to vote with his/her conscience but act to support whatever
decision is made law. "Let this then be the distinctive mark
of an American that in cases of commotion he enlists under no
man's banner, enquires for no man's name, but repairs to the
standard of the laws. Do this and you need never fear anarchy
or tyranny."66 The United States would be recreated as a
gentler and kinder nation by acting out its aggression on
others.
In this vision, historicism is reduced to acting out the
irrational rather than acting as the willing accomplice of
Spirit in history. In nonrational historicist explanations,
the recognition of the contradictions in the values and their
dynamic
are the means to understand the 'cunning of reason' in
history.  It is not sufficient to depict those values as
reified constants. Seymour Martin Lipset, a political
sociologist, has written a series of books67 to document the
stability and continuity of the American character and
identity established at the time of the American revolution so
that the return to a kinder and gentler nation is but the
traditional wheel of the American identity crisis taking one
more turn back to the moral side of its heritage. Unlike most
who, on first glance, saw little to differentiate Canada and
the U.S.A., Lipset has documented those differences in
identity and self-conception through his comparative studies.
For Lipset, the changing face of America is primarily a change
on the surface, from rural to urban, from industrial to
service society, accompanied by a myriad of institutional
changes. The real America, its value system, remains a
constant. Such a view is inadequate to grasp the historicist
perspective and is more akin to providing a law-like
explanation in terms of alternating cycles, an impoverished
and relativist version of the Humean project.
That value system would permeate the debate on whether
Congress would authorize the use of military force in the Gulf
conflict. In order to have that debate, the vast majority of
Americans and the representatives they elected could not be
simplistic patriots or moralists. Nor could they be sceptics
who dismissed the notion of the controlling voice of reason.
Nor historicists either believing they were only acting out
the deeper values and contradictions in being an American.
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